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Abstract 
This paper studies the drivers of bank's credit default swap (CDS) spread, taken as a 
measure of credit risk, by considering the impact of housing market along with a 
number of bank level determinants, such as regulatory capital, leverage, size, 
liquidity, asset quality and operations income ratio. We build upon a unique dataset 
consisting of 115 banks (during pre- and post-crisis periods) headquartered in 30 
countries from both developed and emerging countries. Results suggest that CDS 
spread is driven by asset quality, liquidity and operations income ratio, while bank 
size is found to have a non-monotonic impact on CDS spread. If the bank is small, an 
increase in size reduces the average credit risk. If the bank is large enough, an 
increase in size raises the latter. From our results we derive the level of bank size that 
minimizes the CDS spreads. Financial institutions growing beyond this threshold are 
subject to higher credit risk, implying that smaller and medium sized banks are safer 
than large banks. When considering the estimates in the periods before and after the 
2007 crisis, we further find a different extreme point of bank size in the former 
(approximately 1642 billion Euros) relative to a significantly lower level of optimal 
bank size (around 70 billion) in the post-crisis period, implying too-big-to-fail and 
too-big-to-save in the pre-crisis regime. 
 
Keywords: Bank CDS spread, leverage, capital requirements, liquidity, asset quality, 
bank size, too-big-to-fail financial institutions, financial crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent financial crisis, which originated from the US housing market, is 
considered to be the worst crisis event since the 1929 Great Depression, when the 
crisis spread across sectors and countries via financial markets and balance sheet 
exposures (see Castrén and Rancan, 2014; Paltalidis et al., 2015). The reliance on 
financial engineering and securitization activities boosted mortgage issuance, and 
allowed dramatic credit expansion for more than a decade. However, since 2007, the 
credit boom era appeared to have been officially over when the housing market 
collapsed, financial markets froze, and banks and investors began defaulting. Default 
swaps as a well-known class of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives then emerged as 
an important instrument of pricing default risk at different maturities – the so-called 
credit default swaps (CDS). Trading frictions, such as illiquidity and information 
asymmetries, can create price discrepancies from equilibrium (see, for example, 
Rubia et al., 2016). The excessive size and concentration of banking assumed away 
financial frictions that borrowers might default on their repayments (Goodhart, 2014). 
In order to make banks safer, following the financial crisis that was largely driven by 
an interaction between a housing boom and a bank credit expansion, restructuring 
banking systems, including dismantling universal banks into separate retail and 
investment parts, have been proposed by regulators. In this context, understanding the 
optimal size becomes important, below which too-big-to-fail doctrine is relevant 
where a bail-out guarantee will not be required, while too-big-to-save hypothesis may 
hold beyond the threshold level of bank size where a government is simply not able to 
bail them out. 
Prior to the financial crisis there was the perception that big banks, should 
they face any solvency issues, would benefit from government protection and 
intervention. Most of the large financial institutions somewhat believed that by 
exceeding their optimal size, they would be categorized as too-big-to-fail and too-
important-to-fail and would therefore never have to worry about their solvency. This 
possibly contributed to make the banks growing beyond their optimal size, exceeding 
the allowed leverage intakes and excessively increasing their lending activities to low-
income (sub-prime) consumers. As the financial crisis unveiled, not all the 
systemically important banks benefited from a government bailout, nor government 
interventions necessarily stabilized the banking sector (see Kizys et al., 2016). 
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Actually, Lehman Brothers, which collapsed on the 15 September 2008, is among the 
brightest examples of a systemically important bank that was not saved by the Federal 
Reserve and the Treasury.   
A limited literature has considered the recent financial crisis that led to the 
collapse of many systemically important banks which became bankrupt despite their 
size. These cases raise important questions of whether large banks are truly safer and 
face lower credit risk and narrower CDS spreads compared to smaller banks. Völz 
and Wedow (2011) suggest that CDS price is subject to distortion due to bank size, 
especially for those banks considered as too-big-to-fail. Some banks are larger than 
optimal and, as they tend to bear too high credit risk, they benefit from government 
support in case of negative events. Kane (2000) and Penas and Unal (2004) also 
suggest that large banks take over smaller financial institutions to expand in size. 
Penas and Unal (2004) examine bond returns and bond credit spreads close to the 
announcement of a merger over the period of 1991-1998, and show that medium-size 
banks have the ability to push the combined bank-asset size beyond the too-big-to-fail 
threshold after the merger. In turn, this leads to a higher reduction in the cost of funds 
compared to mega banks and small banks. This gives further incentives for banks to 
grow beyond the optimal size. However, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2013) look at 
CDS and equity prices to investigate whether there are banks that are constrained by 
their size, and conclude that some banks are too-big-to-save. 
Past literature also identifies the importance of the housing market, interest 
rates, yield spread and inflation as significant drivers of credit risk (Duffie & 
Singleton, 1999; Bevan & Garzarelli, 2000; Lekkos & Milas, 2001; In, Brown & 
Fang, 2003; Alexander & Kaeck, 2008; Naifar, 2010; Benbouzid and Mallick, 2013; 
and Benbouzid, Mallick, and Pilbeam, 2017). In addition, some authors look at bank-
level factors driving CDS spread, and find that leverage, regulatory capital, liquidity 
and asset quality, as well as credit ratings tend to significantly impact credit risk 
(Fabozzi et al., 2007; Hull et al., 2004; Collin Dufresne et al., 2001; Campbell and 
Taksler, 2003; Benkert, 2004; and Chiaramonte and Casu, 2013). We include all these 
bank level determinants, also in line with Drago et al. (2017) who show that balance 
sheet determinants dominate market determinants for all banks  
This paper addresses two key issues related to the CDS spread as a measure of 
credit risk. First, it considers the housing market and the bank level factors driving 
CDS spread including the financial crisis period. The second contribution of this 
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paper is that it analyses whether larger banks are subject to higher credit risk 
compared to smaller banks. Our analysis brings important implications for future 
policies as developed countries are battling the previous lax regulatory regime. As 
such, identifying banks that are more prone to default helps the regulator to prevent 
the potential consequences that could arise during economic downturns. This can be 
achieved by establishing and designing specific set of rules and standards to be 
followed by riskier banks and financial institutions. 
The findings of this paper suggest that the bank-level factors continue to be 
the significant drivers of the CDS spread. Although better housing market 
performance  can give rise to higher risk-taking, the result remains less robust as this 
aggregate variable is correlated with the time fixed effect. Second, higher leverage is 
found to be positively associated with CDS spread. In addition, poor asset quality, and 
lower liquidity increase CDS spread. During the crisis period, the key drivers of the 
CDS spread was found to be asset quality, liquidity, operational income and bank 
size, where bigger, more liquid, better asset quality and operationally efficient banks 
were better able to cope with defaults. Leverage was found to be an important factor 
affecting the CDS spread during the pre-crisis period, with a positive impact on credit 
risk, thus implying that banks with higher levels of leverage were facing increased 
CDS spread due to their inability to repay their short-term liabilities. The effect 
however became insignificant in the dynamic model for the crisis period partly due to 
the deleveraging that took place following the crisis. 
Finally, our main results on bank size suggest that bank size has a non-
monotonic impact on the CDS spread. This implies that the bigger the bank, the 
higher the CDS spread, but only after the size exceeds a critical threshold. We allow 
for non-monotonicities in the model by including the squared term of bank size in the 
set of regressors, and find that the impact of the bank size on credit risk depends 
significantly upon the size of the bank. As such, our findings imply that when a small 
financial institution expands, the CDS spread level declines. If a large enough bank 
expands, it tends to face higher CDS spread and increased credit risk. This suggests 
the existence of an optimal bank size where, if a particular bank grows beyond this 
threshold level, it becomes more exposed to credit risk and subject to high CDS 
spreads. Using the preferred dynamic model, we derive the optimal size to be around 
70 billion Euros for our sample, although the threshold level was much higher at 1642 
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billion Euros in the pre-crisis period indicating an increasing level of risk for 
excessively big banks. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature and testable 
hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 present the empirical models. 
Section 5 discusses the empirical findings, and Section 6, finally concludes. 
2. Prior literature and testable hypotheses 
2.1. Too-big-to-fail and too-big-to-save? The impact of bank size upon credit risk 
Before summer 2007, financial institutions and banks were expanding and 
growing in size, given the favorable economic climate. Credit expansion occurred on 
the back of low interest rates and exceptionally low funding costs. This allowed 
bigger banks to benefit and make very high profits. In addition, high foreign funding 
inflow was another factor that greatly contributed to banks’ incentive to grow in size. 
Many small banks in Europe and across the Atlantic drastically expanded. Liabilities 
of the Iceland banking system surpassed the economy’s GDP by 9 times in the last 
quarter of 2007. In a similar vein, the Swiss and the UK banking systems were also 
expanding beyond the recognized norm, surpassing the size of their GDP by 6.3 and 
5.5 times, respectively. In France, Denmark, Belgium, Ireland and Netherlands, the 
banks’ liabilities ratios were twice the size of their country’s GDP. Finally, at least 30 
banks globally were identified to have liabilities twice their countries’ GDP, and 12 
banks having a liability of over $1 trillion (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2013). 
These figures illustrate how banks and financial institutions have been expanding 
recklessly.  
Bank size has been recently analyzed in the context of the CDS market (Völz 
and Wedow, 2013). The authors focused on investigating whether bank size reduces 
market discipline and found that, on average, market discipline exists in the CDS 
market. Nevertheless, the CDS prices are affected for banks that are considered as 
too-big-to-fail. A 1 percent rise in the bank size narrows the CDS spread for the same 
bank by approximately 2 points. Moreover, banks that are already systemically 
important may merge, thus becoming ever larger and narrowing the CDS spread on a 
much larger scale. This affects the entire banking system, because a narrower CDS 
spread signals a more stable bank, and instead it is likely that the CDS spread is 
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narrower because of the large size only. In addition, the authors looked at the too-big-
to-save phenomenon, and found that some banks attain a limit in their size where it 
becomes too hard for the government to intervene in case of a negative credit event or 
crisis, and offer bailout packages because of the high number of depositors expecting 
to be repaid and compensated. 
Another stream of literature documents that bank size impacts the financial 
institutions’ incentives to undertake risky investments and consequently affect its 
credit rating. Demsetz and Strahan (1997) show that large banks have higher lending 
capacity and can increase their debt exposure keeping at the same time a low level of 
credit risk. Furthermore, Sousa (2000) establishes that banks that are considered to be 
too-big-to-fail have a competitive advantage compared to smaller banks, as they find 
a difference of ratings of three credit notches. In the same vein, Rime (2005) also 
looks at bank size and credit ratings and find that bank size exhibits a positive and 
strong impact on issuer ratings. Sousa (2000) and Rime (2005) look at this 
relationship and find that large banks, that reached the threshold of being considered 
too-big-to-fail, enjoyed a considerably higher credit rating and could, therefore, 
benefit from a cheaper cost of funding compared to smaller banks. Similarly, Gómez-
González and Kiefer (2009) also show that large banks have the tendency to 
experience less risk as they have the ability to diversify their assets in a more efficient 
way compared to smaller banks to lower their costs through economies of scale. 
Gómez-González and Kiefer (2009) look at bank size and bank failures, and find that 
small financial institutions are more prone to failure compared to larger financial 
institutions that have a risk diversification advantage. 
In a similar vein, Mishkin (2006) focuses on the too-big-to-fail phenomenon 
and the reaction of large banks to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act 
(FDICIA) that was introduced in the early 90s. He finds that the issues associated 
with too-big-to-fail significantly diminishes after the introduction of FDICIA. This 
result is challenged by Boyd and Gertler (1993) and Ennis and Malek (2005). These 
authors argue that FDICIA gives large US banks higher incentives to invest in risky 
projects, as they had the safety net that the government would not let them down in 
case of financial difficulties because of the potential impact on the systemic stability. 
Banks that pursued the goal of joining the too-big-to-fail circle are found to go 
beyond their optimal size by taking over other smaller banks. This results in higher 
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returns and narrower credit spreads; at the same time, causing an inefficient allocation 
of resources (Kane, 2000; Penas and Unal, 2004). 
Also, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2013) suggest that large banks are more 
prone to risk, focusing on whether the too-big-to-save or too-big-to-fail banks do exist 
in the real financial world. They use the CDS spread as an indicator of the 
approximate credit losses on banks’ liabilities. Their findings suggest that there is a 
negative relationship between both the absolute and the systemic bank size with their 
book-to-market value. This, in turn, implies that if an already systemically important 
bank expands, it becomes too-big-to-save and exposes itself to higher credit risk. 
The role of bank size has also been studied in the context of capital buffers. 
García-Suaza et al. (2012) focus on a panel of Columbian banks over the period of 
1996-2010, and find that large banks behave differently with respect to small banks. 
The larger banks have a higher ability to obtain funding from capital markets and tend 
to keep their capital buffers low during credit expansions without necessarily 
exposing themselves to excessive risk. On the contrary, smaller banks are found to 
have barriers to access financial markets, and therefore face higher costs when trying 
to build their capital buffers. Hakenes and Schnabel (2011) also analyze bank size in 
relation to capital buffers and bank risk incentives. They look at the Basel 2 Capital 
Accord, and show that smaller banks are subject to higher risk taking activities if they 
are allowed to choose between the internal ratings-based, IRB, approach and the 
standardized approach to meet capital requirements. Smaller financial institutions 
tend to compete with larger banks that have such advantage and can lead to higher 
aggregate risk-taking activities. 
Brown and Dinç (2011) study bank failure in the 1990s across 21 emerging 
countries. They design a specific risk hazard model, and show that if there are more 
banks with excessive level of leverage, the government is less likely to let the 
problematic bank to collapse in case financial assistance is required -  this is also 
referred to as too-many-to-fail problem. Steever (2005), studies the role of bank size, 
credit as well as market risk in the context of the equity market. After focusing on the 
relationship between firm size and equity risk for commercial banks, the author finds 
that smaller banks have the tendency to issue loans which are deemed to be safer than 
those issued by larger banks. However, because the former banks are unable to 
diversify their risk exposures as efficiently as the latter, equity risk is almost the same 
for small and big banks. We therefore test the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1: CDS spread is non-monotonically associated with the bank’s size. 
In the light of the recent financial crisis, the functioning of financial markets 
has dramatically changed. As suggested by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2013), 
large banks are more prone to risk, given that they engage in higher scale and riskier 
investments as compared to smaller banks. We therefore assume that before the 
financial crisis, larger banks faced reduced CDS spreads as they had the conviction to 
belong to the category of the too-big-to-fail banks. However, during the recent 
financial crisis, this phenomenon proved to be only limited to the very few big 
financial institutions that were more likely to affect the public. 
2.2. Leverage effect 
Past literature acknowledges the importance of a number of financial variables 
driving credit risk; these include: leverage, regulatory capital, asset quality and 
liquidity. Leverage was at the epicenter of debates among regulators, as one of the 
main factors contributing to the recent crisis. A number of authors incorporated 
leverage among other bank level and country level factors driving credit risk in terms 
of CDS spread and bond spread (Beltratti and Stulz, 2011; Annaert et al., 2013; 
Chiaramonte and Casu, 2013; and Benbouzid, Mallick and Sousa, 2017). Before 
2007, banks and other financial institutions heavily relied on borrowing from capital 
markets beyond their real borrowing capacity, with debt to equity ratios exceeding 20 
times their allowance for many large EU banks. Therefore, in case of a bank run, 
there was a high likelihood of bankruptcy, with the situation potentially deteriorating 
and causing contagion, followed by a systemic collapse of the entire financial system 
(Antao and Lacerda, 2011). In Bernanke and Gertler (1995), pro-cyclical leverage 
was found to have contributed to amplifying risk in the financial markets.  
In addition, Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008) focused on emerging markets and 
showed that leverage cycles have the tendency to translate into contagion, causing a 
flight to collateral and creating volatility in financial markets. In a similar vein, 
Adrian and Shin (2008, 2009, 2010) demonstrate from their findings that leverage is 
countercyclical for non-financial US institutions, and pro-cyclical for investment 
banks. Pro-cyclical leverage has the ability to negatively impact on the business cycle, 
thus causing systemic instability. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2011) show evidence that 
investment banks tremendously expanded their leverage intakes through capital 
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markets, and utilized their strong market power to attract additional funds. The 
presence of deposit insurance played another significant role during the process. 
In Ericsson et al. (2009), CDS spreads were used in both levels and first-
differences, demonstrating that their model was able to explain 23% of CDS spread 
fluctuations. The main variables that were found to drive the CDS spread were 
leverage and volatility, among other variables such as credit ratings, and market 
capitalization. Furthermore, authors including Christie (1982), Collin-Dufresne et al. 
(2001) and Alexander and Kaeck (2008) used bank stocks as a proxy for leverage, and 
found that higher levels of debt were positively associated with credit risk. However, 
Eom et al. (2004) contradict previous findings as their results showed that leverage 
had only limited power to affect bond spread as a proxy for credit risk. 
Hypothesis 2: Higher leveraged banks impact positively on credit risk and CDS 
spreads. 
We assume that leverage and credit default risk are positively associated. As 
such, when a bank starts heavily borrowing, the level of market capitalization 
becomes lower, while its leverage capacity starts exceeding its ability to repay 
investors. In addition, the financial institution becomes vulnerable to shocks and may 
easily go bust if there is a crisis. Over the period of 2007-2008, many banks were 
downgraded due to their excessive leverage intakes, which further hampered their 
ability to attract additional external funding, finally resulting in their collapse.  
2.3. Effect of regulatory capital 
A number of authors investigated the impact of regulatory capital and capital buffers 
on credit risk (Antao and Lacerda, 2011 and Chiaramonte and Casu, 2013). Previous 
literature states that traditionally banks held capital as a buffer against the risk of 
insolvency, and high level of liquid assets in order to protect themselves against 
unexpected high volume of bank withdrawals by depositors (Saidenberg and Strahan, 
1999). However, through the increased use of securitization in the years leading to the 
financial crisis, and the high reliance on the new tools of risk management, many 
financial institutions escaped such regulatory requirements by shifting their debt to off 
balance sheet items. This allowed them to hold less capital to increase their lending 
activities, while complying with the necessary regulatory requirements (Gorton and 
Haubrich, 1990). 
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In Akhavein et al. (1997), systemically important banks were able to decrease 
their capital exposure and increase their lending operations after undergoing a merger. 
In addition, Demsetz and Strahan (1997) found that large banks have the capacity to 
engage in riskier lending activities, keeping at the same time a low level of capital. In 
a similar vein, Froot et al. (1993) and Froot and Stein (1998) analyzed lending 
practices for both financial and non-financial institutions and found that vigorous risk 
management enabled banks to conduct risky and illiquid investments and escape 
regulatory requirements, holding insufficient capital buffers during an unexpected 
crisis.  
Previous literature also looks at various advanced models that banks used in 
order to optimize their capital structure by responding to different types of pressures 
from shareholders, debt holders and price fluctuations in the market (Flannery, 1994; 
Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; and Myers and Rajan, 1998). However, the recent 
financial crisis proved that the previous Basel 1 and Basel 2 Capital Accords were 
strongly criticized as it did not ensure the soundness of the regulatory financial system 
(Antao and Lacerda, 2011). Thus, in 2013, Basel 3 was introduced to strengthen the 
weak financial institutions’ capital requirements, decreasing leverage intakes and 
raising liquidity levels. 
Hypothesis 3: Higher capital buffers reduce credit risk and narrow the CDS spread. 
The hypothesis is that regulatory capital is negatively related to the CDS 
spread. In fact, when banks have stronger capital buffers, in times of crisis, they are 
better equipped to sustain a shock, repay their outstanding liabilities and keep the 
bank in a stable condition, whereas a financial institution that has a low level of 
capital is very likely to go bankrupt if the financial system is hit by a crisis, especially 
with risk-averse investors losing confidence in the system and capital markets 
becoming reluctant to lend. 
2.4. Liquidity effect 
The drastic squeeze in the liquidity levels that followed the 2007-2008 
financial crisis led to a dramatic decrease in the bank lending activities in the 
developed economies. Consequently, a stream of literature started developing in the 
last decade linking liquidity to credit risk, in the context of the recent banking crisis. 
Calice et al. (2009) looked at liquidity spill-overs in sovereign bond and CDS markets 
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and found that for EU countries including Greece, Ireland and Portugal, liquidity of 
the sovereign CDS market has a strong time dependent impact on sovereign bond 
spreads. In a similar vein, De Socio (2013) looked at liquidity and credit risk in the 
Euro-interbank market, decomposing credit and liquidity components of the Euribor 
spread, by using CDS of various financial institutions. Their findings indicate that 
before August 2007 credit risk went up. In October 2008, the situation reversed with 
liquidity risk becoming the main driver of the Euribor spread. Mistrulli (2011) 
showed that bank-level liquidity shocks can be a channel for contagion as a bank 
default may spread to other banks through interbank linkages, while Paltalidis et al. 
(2015) provide evidence for other channels of transmission namely interbank, asset 
price, and sovereign credit risk markets in the banking network. 
Furthermore, Diamond and Rajan (2005) looked at liquidity shortages in the 
context of banking crises, showing that bank failures typically lower liquidity levels 
reducing the already short liquidity reserves. This subsequently caused the level of 
credit default risk to go up and resulted in a contagion and collapse of the entire 
financial system.  Similarly, Qiu and Yu (2012) looked at the determinants of 
liquidity provisions in the OTC market for credit default swaps, focusing on 
fluctuations of CDS liquidity across 732 firms during 2001-2008, and they find that 
big corporations near the investment-grade tend to have the highest liquidity levels. In 
addition, Berger and Bouwman (2010) related liquidity to monetary policy and show 
that during normal economic climate, there is a decrease in liquidity created by small 
banks, and liquidity creation is high before financial crises.  
Hypothesis 4: Higher liquidity reduces credit risk and CDS spread. 
We assume that liquidity and CDS spread are negatively related. The higher 
the liquidity level, the better the bank’s ability to deal with large withdrawals and 
possible bank runs. During the recent financial crisis, banks faced huge liquidity 
shortage, with frozen capital markets which meant that there was no other source of 
liquidity to comply with investors’ demand. Banks with stronger liquidity levels were 
able to sustain themselves, keeping their credit risk and CDS spread levels at 
moderate levels. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 13 
2.5. Asset quality effect 
Credit rating agencies played an important role in the over-pricing of junk 
securities during the recent crisis; thus misleading investors and generating increased 
risk in the financial system (Caprio, 2010). In securitization, investors heavily rely on 
the credit ratings and bank ratios in order to access the asset quality of a particular 
security. As such, pools of mortgage loans were trenched into slices of senior, 
mezzanine and junior tranches, which were later sold according to their credit rating 
(Saunders and Allen, 1999). Thus, asset quality was very hard to be accurately 
captured, given that these structured securities were opaque and very different from 
traditional assets (Duffie, 2008). Even traders who specialized in instruments like 
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO) were hardly able to reflect, with certainty, on 
the quality of the underlying asset and its associated risk of default (Guo and Wu, 
2014). Previous studies that used credit ratings to reflect on the asset quality as a 
driver of the CDS spread include Fabozzi et al. (2007) and Hull et al. (2004). 
Besides credit ratings, past literature also identifies the importance of CAMEL 
indicators, which reflect on Capital, Asset quality, Management, Earnings and 
Liquidity characteristics for each particular bank. Curry et al. (2001) incorporated 
changes in CAMEL ratings in their research in order to uncover the ability of market 
data to predict bank financial distress. Similarly, Evanoff and Wall (2001) also used 
CAMEL indicators when investigating bank risk. Furthermore, Gropp et al. (2004) 
incorporated imaginary CAMEL ratings for each financial institution in their sample 
and found that asset quality among other indicators efficiently identified possible 
rating downgrades in the banking sector. Moreover, both Oshinsky and Olin (2006) 
and DeYoung et al. (2001) used CAMEL indicators to reflect on bank distress in the 
US and found that all of the financial variables, including asset quality, had 
significant explanatory power in affecting the probabilities of bank failure.  
Asset quality was also used in previous research as a measure of credit risk. 
Otker-Robe and Podpiera (2010) looked at the determinants of credit default risk 
using three different bank level ratios to reflect asset quality, namely loan loss 
provisions to total loans, share of non-performing loans to total loans, as well as loan 
loss reserves ratios. Findings unveil that since the data did not look at the entire crisis 
period, asset quality was not found to be a significant driver of credit risk. Similarly, 
Chiaramonte and Casu (2013) also used the ratio of loan loss reserve to gross loans 
and the ratio of unreserved impaired loans to equity in order to reflect on the quality 
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of bank assets when investigating the drivers of CDS spread. Furthermore, Koetter et 
al. (2010) investigated bank risk by using the ratio of non-performing loans to total 
assets as a measure of asset quality. 
Hypothesis 5: higher asset quality reduces both CDS spread and credit risk. 
We assume that the higher the asset quality, the narrower the CDS spread and 
credit risk. Thus when a bank is more cautious about the quality of the assets, it holds 
in its balance sheet and ensures that these assets are not of a toxic nature; in case there 
is a negative credit event, it becomes less prone to major default and bankruptcy. 
3. Data and empirical model 
3.1. Data 
We look at 30 countries and 115 banks with annual data over the period 2004-
2011. All the bank-level explanatory variables used to reflect bank characteristics are 
from Bankscope (Bureau Van Dijk). Table A.1 and Table A.2 describe the list of 
banks and countries under investigation. Data sources are summarized in Table 1, 
along with the tested hypotheses. The expected signs are arrived at by reviewing the 
literature and through visual inspections as displayed in Panel A to E of the 
Illustrative Graphs. Bank size which does not have an unambiguous sign requires 
further investigation in establishing a non-monotonic relationship as discussed in 
hypothesis 1. 
The CDS for each bank is used in terms of the natural logarithm of the mid-
spread. It has a 5-year maturity as it is the most liquid type of index and is 
denominated in the country’s local currency and expressed in basis points. It is 
published by CMA and retrieved from Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
The set of bank-level explanatory variables includes financial ratios which are 
drawn from the relevant literature as potential explanatory variables for the credit 
spreads as, among others, in Collin Dufresne et al. (2001), Campbell and Taksler 
(2003), Benkert (2004), Hull et al. (2004), Ötker-Robe and Podpiera (2010), 
Chiaramonte and Casu (2013), and Fabozzi et al. (2007). More specifically: 
 House price data for each country is published by Oxford Economics, and 
retrieved from Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
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 Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to common equity. 
 Regulatory Capital is the Tier 2 Capital, computed as the difference between 
Total Capital and Tier 1 Capital. 
 Asset Quality is the ratio of impaired loans to equity.  
 Bank Liquidity is ratio of liquid assets to total deposits and borrowing. 
 Operations Income Ratio is EBITA to average assets. 
 Bank Size is the natural logarithm of the bank total assets. 
Table 1 
Description of variables 
Variable 
Description Source 
Expected 
sign 
Dependent 
    
  
 
 
ln(CDS) Natural logarithm of the 
CDS in basis points, 
denominated in the 
country’s local currency, 
5 year, bank level, mid-
spread. 
 CMA, from 
Thomson Reuters 
Datasteream 
 
Independent 
      
  ln(HP) Natural logarithm of the 
House Price Index in basis 
points.  
Oxford 
Economics, from 
Thomson Reuters 
Datastream  
(-) 
 Regulatory 
Capital 
Tier 2 Capital = (Total 
Capital – Tier 1 Capital) 
Bankscope (-) 
 Leverage Long term debt to 
common equity 
World Scope 
Fundamentals, 
from Thomson 
Reuters 
Datasteream  
(+) 
 Liquidity Liquid Assets to Deposits 
and ST Funding 
Bankscope (-) 
 Asset 
Quality 
Impaired Loans to Equity Bankscope (+) 
 Operations 
Income 
Ratio 
EBITA to Average Assets Bankscope (-) 
  Size Log of Total Assets Bankscope (+/-) 
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3.2. The empirical model 
We begin with estimating the following model: 
                                          
where i is the bank, j is the economy, t is the year,             is natural logarithm 
of the bank CDS spread; lnHP is the natural logarithm of the house price index;    is 
the Bank fixed effect;    is the Time fixed effect and        iid disturbance term. 
The analysis of the empirical performance of Eq. (1) helps studying the impact 
of the presence of the time component of the error term on the estimate for   . The 
time component of the error term is important in controlling the estimated parameters 
for bank and time invariant determinants of CDS other than the house price, which are 
potentially omitted in the estimating equation. 
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Panel A: CDS spread (y axis) and Leverage Panel B: CDS spread (y axis) and Regulatory Capital 
Note: Higher level of leverage tends to be associated with
higher credit risk.
Higher regulatory capital tends to lower credit risk as reflected
in CDS spreads.
Panel C: CDS spread (y axis)  and Asset Quality Panel D: CDS spread (y axis) and Liquidity
Lower asset quality (as reflected in higher bad loans on the x -
axis) tends to increase credit risk.
Higher liquidity on average tends to be associated with lower
credit risk.
Panel E: CDS spread (y axis) and Operations Income Panel F: CDS spread (y axis)  and Bank Size 
Higher operating income on average tends to be associated
with lower credit risk.
Larger banks tend to have lower credit risk, although the
relationship appears to be non-monotonic.
Illustrative graphs
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However, the house price index is country-specific and hence it is bank-
invariant. This complicates the use of time effects, as these are bank-invariant as well. 
Strictly speaking time dummies can be included in that the variability can occur at 
country-level. On the other hand, there exists a problem of near collinearity between 
the house price index and time effects. Yet without time dummies, the question would 
arise whether the house price index would capture effects other than that we are 
interested in. 
To determine how far this is and gauge the impact of this modelling decision 
on our empirical results, we compare the results and statistical performance from Eq. 
(1) with that produced by two other models: 
                                
and 
                                       
The comparison between Eq. (1) and (2) provides information about the role of 
        as against that of the time effects on their own that, in turn, control for all the 
bank-invariant macroeconomic variables that potentially affect the bank’s CDS. The 
comparison between Eq. (1) and (3) provides information on the effect of near multi-
collinearity on our estimated parameters, and on how much explanatory power we 
may lose by not including time effects in the set of regressors. 
Having decided the structure of the error term and studied the role of near 
perfect multicollinearity on the estimate, we generalize the estimating model by 
including a number of potential determinants of the bank’s CDS in the set of 
regressors: 
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where Asset Quality is the impaired loans/equity ratio; Liquidity is liquid assets to 
total deposits and short-term funding; Regulatory Capital is the tier 2 capital; 
Leverage is the long-term debt to common equity and Operations is the EBITA over 
average assets. 
We then generalize the model to consider the impact of bank size, explicitly 
allowing for potential non-monotonicities of the impacts of interest, by adding the 
natural logarithm of bank total assets,             , and its squared value, to the set 
of regressors: 
                  
                                              
                                                         
                                       
               
All models are estimated both via the Fixed effects and the Random Effects 
estimators. The fixed effects model controls for the effects of time-invariant variables 
with time-invariant effects. Therefore, it permits controlling for any unobserved 
country-specific time-invariant effects in the data, by conditioning them out and 
taking deviations from time averaged individual means. The result of this is the 
removal of any long-run variation in the dependent variable. In a random effects 
model, the unobserved variables are assumed to be statistically independent of all the 
observed variables. We report the preferred model based upon the Hausman test. 
In estimating Eq (5), we implicitly assume that the impact of the independent 
variables on the bank CDS is constant over time. This is a strong assumption which 
impacts upon the estimates and is worth studying rather than imposing at the outset, 
given that the period under investigation contains the 2007 financial crisis. We 
proceed with two exercises. In a first exercise, we estimate Eq. (5) using the 
subsample of observations from 2004 to 2007, and from 2008 to 2011. This allows us 
to study whether the financial crisis had a significant role in changing the impact of 
the independent variables on the bank’s CDS. 
As a second exercise, we allow explicitly for dynamics in the estimating 
model. We assume that the observed CDS of the bank i,                , adjusts 
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gradually to its equilibrium level,                
  because of the role of time in 
taking measurement and potential institutional inertia: 
                                                      
                      
where the actual change in observed bank’s CDS is a fraction λ of the adjustment to 
its equilibrium, and 0<λ≤1, captures the delay in the adjustment process. In turn, the 
equilibrium level is defined as: 
                  
 
                                              
                                                         
                                       
               
Combining Eq. (6) with Eq. (7) gives the following estimating model: 
                  
                                                 
                                         
                                 
                                        
               
where       ,      for all the independent variables. As for the case of Eq. (5) 
we estimate Eq. (8) using both the entire sample period, and the subsample of 
observations from 2004 to 2007, and from 2008 to 2011. The two exercises allow us 
to study the extent to which estimated parameters are robust to significant variation 
over time of the economic environment. We note that, in Estimating Eq. (8), the joint 
presence of the lagged dependent variable and of the unobservable country-specific 
effects in the estimating model, makes the Within Group estimator unfeasible. This is 
because the lagged dependent variables and the bank fixed effects are necessarily 
correlated even if the idiosyncratic component of the error term is serially 
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uncorrelated and the Within Groups estimator does not help as it is known to give 
downward biased estimates for   (Nickell, 1981). This discussion calls for the use of 
the DIF-GMM estimator in first instance (Arellano and Bond, 1991). This procedure 
removes the time invariant component of Eq. (8) by taking first difference, and 
exploits the dynamic properties of the data to generate instrumental variables, where 
particular care must be given to the choice of the set of instruments. We opt for the 
parsimonious approach as far as the sets of instruments are concerned, and use the t-2 
lag only for all the variables in the set of instruments. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Results on CDS determinants 
We report results for the above models specified in the previous section. 
Results are summarised in Tables 2-4. According to the Hausman test, the FE model 
is the preferred method of estimation in the majority of the cases. Based on this 
evidence, we report parameters estimated with FE only. Standard errors are robust to 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
Results from the first Column of Table 2 suggest that the house price is not 
statistically significant, leading to the conclusion that the housing market has a neutral 
effect on credit risk in the benchmark model. Higher house prices are associated with 
higher CDS spreads, but the effect turns out to be insignificant when the time fixed 
effects are included in the set of regressors. As expected, indeed, the F-statistic shows 
that all regressors, i.e. the house price and the time dummies, are jointly statistically 
significant. This may be due to the near perfect collinearity between the variable and 
the time dummies. This is confirmed by results in Column (2) and (3), where the 
former shows that the house price is statistically significant if the time dummies are 
removed from the set of regressors, and the latter suggests that the statistics associated 
with the set of time times alone improve if the house price is removed from the set of 
regressors. This follows the economic rationale given that before summer 2007, real 
estate sector was continuously appreciating in value, banks were therefore subject to 
lower credit risk as not only they were able to regain the initial mortgage value if the 
borrower defaulted, but they could also earn a profit. 
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Our findings show that, in line with expectation, liquidity has a negative and 
statistically significant impact on CDS spread. This implies that liquid banks can cope 
better with large withdrawals and avoid bank-runs. The main responsibility of 
financial institutions is to provide liquidity to depositors and creditors by standing 
ready to offer them cash on demand. In the traditional framework, liquidity risk 
comes from the risk arising from bank-runs. This is a situation where depositors lose 
trust in their bank and withdraw their funds, driving investor sentiment down, either 
as a result of concerns about the bank’s financial condition or because they worry that 
other depositors may also start withdrawing their funds, thus causing bank-runs. Such 
runs could make banks insolvent by initiating a chain reaction that may force a fire 
sale of illiquid loans. This in turn can result in bankruptcy of the financial institution. 
Table 2 
Parameters estimation 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: CDS spread (ln)         
House Price Index (ln) 
0.91
9  
3.243
***   
0.36
5  1.074  
2.613
** 1.982  
2.614
* 
  (1.0
00) 
(0.71
5) 
  (1.0
70) 
(1.08
1) 
(1.12
4) 
(1.53
6) 
(1.55
0) 
Liquidity       
-
0.00
2  
-
0.004
* 
-
0.011
** 
#####
### 
-
0.016
** 
(Liquid Assets / Dep & 
ST Funding) 
      (0.0
02) 
(0.00
2) 
(0.00
5) 
(0.00
6) 
(0.00
7) 
Asset Quality         
0.007
*** 
0.011
*** 
0.018
** 
0.025
*** 
(Impaired Loans / 
Equity) 
        (0.00
2) 
(0.00
2) 
(0.00
7) 
(0.00
6) 
Regulatory Capital           
-
0.052  
-
0.142  
-
0.063  
(Tier 2 Capital)           (0.04
0) 
(0.11
0) 
(0.11
2) 
Leverage             
0.070
** 0.015  
(Long-term debt to 
equity) 
            (0.03
1) 
(0.02
6) 
Operations Income 
Ratio               
#####
### 
(EBITA / Avg Assets)               (0.08
0) 
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Time dummies  (joint) 
97.2
4 - 
111.
93 
96.9
3 40.03 24.96 9.89 10.76 
Adjusted R
2
 
0.63
0 0.364 
0.65
8 
0.61
7 0.631 0.652 0.725 0.756 
Hausman Specification 
test 
29.9
4 32.34 
23.5
4 
20.4
2 31.46 13.78 16.26 44.26 
All regressors (joint) 
83.5
8 20.55 
111.
93 
73.0
5 52.46 44.67 21.79 27.02 
House Price Index (ln) 0.84 20.55 - 0.12 0.99 5.41 1.67 2.81 
Notes: The sample includes 115 banks in 20 countries from 2004 to 2011. All the 
models include time dummies. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
standard errors are clustered by country and reported in brackets. *** (**), [*] stands 
for the variable being statistical significant at 1% (5%) [10%] s.l. 
 
Our results suggest that there is a somewhat unstable positive relationship 
between leverage and credit risk (CDS spread). Therefore, in case of a bank-run, there 
was a high likelihood of bankruptcy, which could potentially translate into a 
contagion and cause a systemic collapse of the entire financial system (Antão and 
Lacerda, 2011). When capital markets and money markets face shortage of liquidity, 
the only banks that are able to survive without the heavy reliance on borrowing from 
the lemon markets are those that hold higher levels of liquidity. In 2007, banks such 
as Northern Rock were unable to survive and had to be bailed out by the Bank of 
England as a result of bank-runs. In fact, as of September 2007, Northern Rock’s 
liquidity gap within 3 months was more than £25 billion. As such, in less than one 
year, Northern Rock was under the obligation to refund £30 billion, with all the 
associated market risks (Congdon et al., 2009). 
Our results are in line with Annaert et al. (2013) who find that the most 
important driver of credit risk in the Euro area was liquidity spread. Chiaramonte and 
Casu (2013) also focused on bank balance-sheet ratios and showed that liquidity 
played an important role in explaining credit risk and more specifically the CDS 
spread. Moreover, Chen et al. (2007), Fabozzi et al. (2007) and Annaert et al. (2013) 
find that liquidity is an important determinant of CDS spread. Our results also suggest 
that asset quality impacts CDS spread significantly and, in line with expectations, 
positively. This suggests that bank CDS spreads reflect risk captured by the bank 
balance sheet, i.e., the risk associated with their asset quality. More specifically, the 
ratio of impaired loans/equity proves to have a significantly positive link with banks’ 
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CDS spread. The higher the ratio (i.e. as the ratio of impaired loans/equity increases), 
the more problematic the loan, and hence the positive coefficient of this ratio reflects 
higher credit risk due to the deterioration of asset quality. Graph 3 also supports this 
argument, where there is a positive relationship between the fluctuations of the 
ln(CDS) spread and asset quality, which in turn implies that higher impaired 
loans/equity lead to higher credit risk. This finding is consistent with Chiaramonte 
and Casu (2013), who proxy asset quality with the Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loans 
ratio, and find this variable as a significant driver of CDS spread, indicating that the 
probability of default increases especially for banks that have low quality loan 
portfolios.  
The third finding relates to the relationship between bank-level leverage and 
CDS spread. In fact, banks were heavily borrowing from capital markets when credit 
conditions were booming, and lending to financial institutions was made easy with 
consumers blindly investing their savings in banks expecting to earn interest. In 
addition, financial engineering and securitization also greatly contributed to the 
increased leverage intakes that banks were subject to. This was reflected in the 
deterioration of banks’ asset quality. With the beginning of financial crisis, the true 
leverage ratios came to light revealing that most banks were borrowing well above the 
authorized norms. In fact, Ericsson et al. (2009) show that leverage, among other 
factors, explain approximately 23% of CDS spread fluctuations. Table 3 below 
indicates that the higher the leverage level, the wider the CDS spread, reflecting 
greater credit risk. Thus, banks that borrowed more aggressively experienced much 
higher CDS spread levels. During the financial crisis, the highly leveraged banks lost 
access to external funding when capital markets froze. In addition, consumers lost 
confidence in the banking sector and were withdrawing their savings. The control 
variables namely regulatory capital and operations income ratio are discussed in the 
following section. While regulatory capital remains insignificant as a factor driving 
credit risk, the operating income however does make play a significant role in 
explaining the variability of credit risk across banks. 
4.2. Sensitivity to the definition of CDS determinants 
We assess the sensitivity of the benchmark model to the choice of bank 
characteristics. Therefore, in estimating the models reported in Table 3, we: (i) 
replace the ratio of Impaired Loans / Equity with the ratio of Impaired Loans / Gross 
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Loans, as a measure of asset quality; (ii) replace the ratio of Liquid Assets / Deposits 
& Short-term Funding with the ratio of Liquid Assets / Total Deposits & Borrowings 
as a measure of liquidity; (iii) replace Tier 2 Capital Ratio by the Total Capital Ratio 
as a measure of regulatory capital (iv) replace the ratio of Long-term Debt to Common 
Equity by the ratio of Equity / Total Assets as a measure of leverage; (v) replace the 
ratio of EBITA (Earnings Before Interest Tax and Earnings)/ Average Assets by 
Return On Average Equity (ROAE), as an indicator of bank-level operations Income 
ratio. 
The results show that the main findings remain unchanged. Therefore, any 
deterioration in the asset quality ratio leads to an increase in credit risk, while a rise in 
the degree of liquidity of the assets held by banks reduces their default risk in a 
significant manner. In addition, the results also show that the level of bank operations 
income ratio is negatively related to the CDS spread and credit risk. As for the 
regulatory capital and leverage, the findings from table 6 do not suggest a significant 
impact on banks’ CDS spread. Yet, the coefficient associated with leverage variable is 
positive and significant for the pre-crisis period. Higher capital requirements tend to 
be costly for a financial institution and are usually perceived as a burden. The riskier a 
bank's portfolio, the more capital it will be required to hold. By being forced to keep a 
certain percentage of capital as a cushion in case there is a negative credit event, a 
bank’s investment may be reduced, which decreases its competitiveness in financial 
markets. The insignificant effect of regulatory capital suggests that on average the 
impact of this variable on credit risk is neutral.  
Table 3 
Parameters estimation: robustness checks 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: CDS spread (ln)       
House Price Index (ln) 0.213  1.215  0.782  0.555  0.339  
  (1.075) (1.224) (1.364) (1.325) (1.253) 
Liquidity -0.017  -0.017  -0.021* -0.025** -0.023* 
(Liquid Assets / Tot Dep & 
Bor) 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Asset Quality   0.125*** 0.119*** 0.102*** 0.044  
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(Impaired Loans / Gross 
Loans) 
  (0.026) (0.032) (0.033) (0.040) 
Regulatory Capital     -0.002  0.024  0.033  
(Total Capital Ratio)     (0.033) (0.035) (0.037) 
Leverage       -0.089* -0.015  
(Equity / Liabilities)       (0.050) (0.048) 
Operations Income Ratio         -0.014*** 
(Return On Avg Equity)         (0.004) 
Time dummies  (joint) 70.75 31.83 19.14 17.16 17.43 
Adjusted R
2
 0.620 0.627 0.621 0.623 0.642 
Hausman Specification test 27.44 7.91 14.23 10.45 6.94 
Notes: The sample includes 115 banks in 20 countries from 2004 to 2011. All the models 
include time dummies. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are 
clustered by country and reported in brackets. *** (**), [*] stands for the variable being 
statistical significant at 1% (5%) [10%] s.l. 
 
Besides, our results confirm the importance of bank operations income ratio, 
measured by (Return on Average Equity, ROAE), in lowering credit risk, as it has a 
negative and highly significant effect on bank CDS. The negative relationship 
between bank operating income and bank CDS spread is demonstrated in graph 5. In 
addition, one of the explanations of the insignificance of leverage as a driver of the 
CDS spread post-crisis relates to the fact that banks used off-balance sheet 
securitization in order to hide their real leverage intakes to finance their investment 
activities. In addition, this also translated into bank’s ability to escape regulatory 
requirements by showing less leverage in their balance sheet. This is one of the 
reasons that explain the sensitivity of the leverage as a driver of the CDS spread in the 
pre-crisis period, but turned out insignificant in the post-crisis period in our final 
dynamic specification to be presented later in this section. 
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4.3. Is the impact of size on CDS spread non-monotonic? 
Having decided the preferred model, we study the impact of bank’s size upon 
the credit spread. Table 4 shows that bank size is positively correlated with CDS 
spread in terms of its direct effect. Bank size would grow as the bank total assets rise. 
The findings indicate that the bigger the bank, the higher the CDS spread. In fact, 
during the credit boom of early 2000, banks were enjoying high credit injections in 
the form of foreign funding inflows. This enabled them to expand their lending 
activities, mostly through the issuance of complex mortgage securities, which in turn 
boosted their profits. The idea of increasing their size in both domestic and 
international markets was appealing to these financial institutions. As such, the 
phenomenon of the too-big and the too-important-to-fail gave banks the wrong 
incentives to grow beyond their optimal size, believing that they would never collapse 
as the government would always be there to rescue them. However, as the recent 
financial crisis unfolded, many of these big financial institutions were left to go 
bankrupt. Therefore, bigger banks beyond a threshold level were subject to higher 
credit risk and wider CDS spreads. The financial institutions that were closely linked 
to the public, such as AIG, did benefit from a government bailout package. 
To assess the empirical validity of the link between bank size and CDS spread, 
we introduce a quadratic term of bank size (            ). If the impact of size on 
CDS spread is non-monotonic, then at low levels of bank size, CDS spread moves 
negatively with bank size, while there is a critical threshold beyond which further 
increases in bank size lead to a rise in the CDS spread. However, in order to ensure 
that the U-shape relationship between the CDS spread and bank size really exists, it is 
essential to conduct the U-test by Lind and Mehlum (2010). More precisely, we have 
followed the approach adopted by Leonida et al. (2012), where the authors 
investigated the effect of political replacement effect in a panel of 102 countries over 
the period of 1980-2005 and tested for the presence of a U-shape relationship. In 
addition, they also tested for non-monotonicity in the relationship between political 
competition and economic reform, by examining whether the relationship is 
decreasing at low values and increasing at high values within the data range. 
Table 4 
Parameters estimation: the impact of size 
Independent variable (1) (2) 
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Dependent variable: CDS spread (ln) 
House Price Index (ln) 2.515  3.059* 
  (1.729) (1.735) 
Liquidity -0.011  -0.010  
(Liquid Assets / Dep & ST Funding) (0.007) (0.007) 
Asset Quality 0.026** 0.027** 
(Impaired Loans / Equity) (0.010) (0.010) 
Regulatory Capital -0.058  -0.062  
(Tier 2 Capital) (0.116) (0.118) 
Leverage 0.023  0.017  
(Long-term debt to equity) (0.034) (0.032) 
Operations Income Ratio -0.341*** -0.401*** 
(EBITA / Avg Assets) (0.105) (0.109) 
Size 1.281** -7.036* 
(ln Total Assets) (0.619) (3.590) 
Size
2
  
  
0.309** 
(ln Total Assets)
2
   (0.132) 
Time dummies  (joint) 37.74 43.88 
Adjusted R
2
 0.790 0.796 
Hausman Specification test 84.06 -5.160 
Extreme Point   11.380 
Slope at:     
Minimum (p-value)   -4.861 (0.041) 
Maximum (p-value)   4.184 (0.003) 
Test for U-shape (p-value)   1.820 (0.041) 
Notes: The sample includes 115 banks in 20 countries from 2004 to 2011. All the models 
include time dummies. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors 
are clustered by country and reported in brackets. *** (**), [*] stands for the variable 
being statistical significant at 1% (5%) [10%] s.l. 
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In our analysis, for each model, we report the interval, the slope estimated at 
the minimum and maximum values, the associated t -statistics, as well as the test for 
the overall significance of a U-shaped relationship. For all of the models, we also 
report the estimated extreme point together with the associated confidence interval 
estimated by the Fieller method. Our empirical analysis strongly supports the 
existence of a U shape relationship between bank CDS spread and bank size. The 
quadratic term of Bank Size is positive and statistically significant at 5% level, while 
the linear term is negative and also significant at 5% or 1% level across different 
models. In addition, the U-test proves that there is a U-shape relationship linking CDS 
spread and bank size. As such, these findings from table 6-8 are supportive of a non-
linear relationship and allow us to derive from the estimated equation the critical 
value of bank size beyond which the CDS spread starts increasing. The U-test for all 
models in Tables 5-8 confirms the existence of the U-shape relationship. The 
threshold point can be derived from the estimated equation (5) with the static 
estimates. 
This implies that the optimal bank size in terms of absolute values will be: exp 
(10.46) which approximately equals 35 billion Euros. From equation (5), it can be 
observed that the turning point is equal to 35 billion Euros. This point indicates that as 
bank size increases above this threshold, it causes the CDS spread to widen and the 
credit risk to subsequently go up. Thus, bank size and the CDS spread are negatively 
related up until the optimal size of the bank in terms of total assets. This implies that 
smaller banks face lower credit risk. After this threshold, bank size and the CDS 
spread become positively related, implying that the bigger the bank, the higher the 
CDS spread and credit risk.  
The results show that the level of credit risk varies across big and small banks. 
As such, smaller banks typically experience narrower CDS spread and lower level of 
credit risk. They are therefore safer, although they do not have the same ability to 
diversify their risk portfolios as bigger financial institutions; these banks are 
considered to be more cautious with their investment decision-making process. This 
finding is in line with the literature on the too-big-to-save. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2013) focused on equity prices and CDS spread in the context of public 
deficit and bailouts. Their findings show that the too-big-to-save hypothesis infers 
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that large banks are typically subject to reduced bailout prospects particularly in 
countries that experience fiscal constraints. Therefore, bigger banks are considered to 
be riskier, while smaller banks, which conduct small size investment activities, are 
considered to be safer and more secure. 
4.4. The role of time 
Up to this point we have adopted very simple models to identify Banks CDS 
determinants. These empirical models do not take into account the time-varying 
changes in the determinants of Credit Default Swaps. The risk is that our models miss 
some important information in the CDS. The existing literature shows that CDS 
spreads are following a Markov Switching process. Alexander and Kaeck (2008), 
among others, show that there are regime dependent determinants for Credit Default 
Swaps. Accordingly, Kizys, Paltalidis and Vergos (2016) provide ample evidence for 
a Bayesian Markov Switching determinant for Banks and Sovereign Credit Default 
Swaps. 
The implicit hypothesis our models did follow is that the impact of the 
explanatory variables on the dependent variable is constant over time. The approach is 
that because the data span is not long, this hypothesis is not a strong one. However, 
our sample period contains the 2007 crisis, and hence allows us to study the 
determinants of CDS spread under very different regimes. The next step of our 
analysis is to assume that two regimes exist, that in our case, are exogenously 
determined. We hence prefer to use this information to split the sample, instead of 
letting the data to determine it endogenously by using a regime switching model. This 
is justified by the 2007 financial crisis being the large event in the sample period. 
Hence, having determined a preferred model, we have estimated the same model in 
two sub-samples, i.e. before the crisis, and the remaining sample. 
Results are reported in Table 5 which remain consistent for some variables as 
in the overall sample, namely operations income ratio and bank size along with 
showing non-monotonic effects. We however note that the model does not perform as 
good as when the sample is not split. This is likely due to the role on near collinearity. 
To check the extent to which this is the case, we have performed a general to specific 
approach, that leads to our preferred models, both for the entire period, and for the 
subsamples. Those results are reported in Table 6 and remain consistent with the 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 31 
overall sample with two exceptions namely leverage and bank size (in terms of the 
magnitude of its effect although the sign remains the same as in overall sample).  
Table 5 
Parameters estimation: the impact of time 
Independent variable (1)   (2) 
Dependent variable: CDS spread (ln) 
  time < 2007   time ≥ 2007 
House Price Index (ln) 2.252    2.057  
  (1.461)   (2.421) 
Liquidity -0.002    -0.019  
(Liquid Assets / Dep & ST Funding) (0.002)   (0.013) 
Asset Quality -0.006    0.034** 
(Impaired Loans / Equity) (0.003)   (0.015) 
Regulatory Capital 0.004    -0.050  
(Tier 2 Capital) (0.082)   (0.120) 
Leverage 0.074**   -0.025  
(Long-term debt to equity) (0.025)   (0.041) 
Operations Income Ratio -0.950***   -0.494*** 
(EBITA / Avg Assets) (0.234)   (0.135) 
Size -31.919***   -10.267* 
(ln Total Assets) (8.680)   (5.157) 
Size
2
  1.135***   0.446** 
(ln Total Assets)
2
 (0.309)   (0.190) 
Time dummies  (joint) 7.360    2.600  
Adjusted R
2
 0.908   0.639 
Hausman Specification test 16.49   37.00 
Extreme Point 14.056   11.513 
Slope at:       
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Minimum (p-value) -23.932 (0.001)   -7.130 (0.037) 
Maximum (p-value) 9.292 (0.002)   5.917 (0.002) 
Test for U-shape (p-value) 3.550 (0.002)   1.860 (0.037) 
Notes: The sample includes 115 banks in 20 countries from 2004 to 2011. All the models 
include time dummies. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are 
clustered by country and reported in brackets. *** (**), [*] stands for the variable being 
statistical significant at 1% (5%) [10%] s.l. 
 
Leverage however has an opposite effect in both periods in the sense that 
while higher leverage added to higher credit risk in the pre-crisis period, it had a 
dampening effect in the post-crisis period which later turned insignificant in a 
dynamic model to be presented in the next sub-section. 
Table 6. Parameters estimation: robustness to the General-to-Specific exercise 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: 
CDS spread 
(ln) 
    
  Entire period time < 2007 time ≥ 2007 
Liquidity -0.013**   -0.017** 
(Liquid Assets / Dep & ST 
Funding) 
(0.006)   (0.007) 
Asset Quality 0.015*   0.012*** 
(Impaired Loans / Equity) (0.008)   (0.002) 
Leverage 0.060** 0.044** -0.278*** 
(Long-term debt to equity) (0.027) (0.016) (0.069) 
Operations Income Ratio -0.185** -0.829***   
(EBITA / Avg Assets) (0.087) (0.092)   
Size -4.894** -24.342*** -4.339** 
(ln Total Assets) (1.909) (5.695) (1.867) 
Size
2
  0.234*** 0.880*** 0.203** 
(ln Total Assets)
2
 (0.078) (0.195) (0.080) 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 33 
Time dummies  (joint) 27.290 4.930  18.880  
Adjusted R
2
 0.714 0.988 0.493 
Hausman Specification test 52.650 49.14 27.40 
Extreme Point 10.458 13.824 10.663 
Slope at:       
Minimum (p-value) 
-3.248 
(0.013) 
-18.148 
(0.001) 
-2.907 
(0.016) 
Maximum (p-value) 3.598 (0.001)  7.614 (0.001) 3.046 (0.005) 
Test for U-shape (p-value) 2.360 (0.013) 4.200 (0.001) 2.200 (0.016) 
Notes: The sample includes 115 banks in 20 countries from 2004 to 2011. All the 
models include time dummies. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
standard errors are clustered by country and reported in brackets. *** (**), [*] stands 
for the variable being statistical significant at 1% (5%) [10%] s.l. 
4.5. Dynamics and endogeneity 
We finally estimate a dynamic model. Results are reported in Table 7. The 
exercises show that the results are robust to a number of modification of the 
estimation method and the independent variables. According to the Arellano-Bond 
test, there is no evidence of second order autocorrelation; therefore, our model is 
correctly specified. The difference equation is instrumented with the one period 
lagged levels of the dependent variable, and the levels equation with the difference 
lagged one period. Moreover, we report Sargan-Hansen test that follows the Chi-
squared distribution with (L-K) degrees of freedom, testing the validity of 
instruments. Under the null, the instruments included are uncorrelated with the error 
term, thus they are valid. The outcome of the Sargan test would indicate whether the 
equation is correctly identified or is over-identified. Under the null hypothesis, the 
equation is adequately and correctly identified. The alternative hypothesis states that 
the model is over-identified (i.e. the number of instruments is more than the number 
of endogenous variables). According to our findings from table 7, the p-values for the 
Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions, where the null hypothesis is that the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals, confirm that the instruments are not 
correlated with the residuals and they are valid instruments. Furthermore, we are 
satisfying the condition whereby the number of instruments is 22 and is less than the 
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number of groups, which is equal to 24. The lagged dependent variable is statistically 
significant reflecting a high degree of persistence in the variables during the pre-crisis 
period.  
Table 7 reports the results from the GMM analysis which are consistent with 
the outcome obtained from both the benchmark model and the bank size model. Our 
findings indicate that the bank level determinants tend to drive credit risk. The 
positive relationship between asset quality and the CDS spread is demonstrated in 
table 7. As the ratio of impaired loans to equity increases, the quality of assets 
decreases. This implies that the bank becomes riskier when it holds a higher 
proportion of toxic assets. Before the recent financial crisis, banks heavily invested in 
highly structured products that were associated with very high risks. This was 
particularly easy with the increased popularity of securitization activities and financial 
engineering. As the crisis began, many of banks’ assets started defaulting due to their 
toxic nature. This was despite the excessively high rating most structured products 
enjoyed before the beginning of the crisis. In fact, credit rating agencies played a 
predominant role in boosting the ratings of highly risky instruments to increase their 
marketability. The GMM results are in line with the previous findings and confirm the 
hypothesis, which stipulates that a bank with more reliable quality of assets will face 
reduced credit risk. 
Furthermore, the findings also illustrate the negative relationship between the 
CDS spread and bank liquidity. As such, banks with higher levels of liquidity were in 
a better position to avoid bank-runs that resulted from the recent financial crisis. From 
summer 2007, both money markets and capital markets stopped lending to banks and 
other financial institutions. Therefore, financial markets froze. In addition, investors’ 
sentiment reached its lowest level as consumers and lenders lost trust in the financial 
system and decided to withdraw their deposits from banks. The only financial 
institutions that were able to withstand the crisis were those that kept high liquidity 
levels and were able to sustain themselves despite the lemon markets. Thus, the banks 
that had high levels of liquidity were subject to tighter CDS spread and lower credit 
risk. 
Moreover, table 7 shows evidence of a negative relationship between the level 
of bank operating income ratio (EBITA / Average Assets) and the CDS spread. As 
such, banks that are more profitable are better able to cope with negative credit event 
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and are considered to be stronger as compared to banks that have low levels of 
operating income ratio, in line with the initial hypothesis. 
Last but not the least, the results in table 7 demonstrate that, on average, the 
CDS spread and bank size are positively related. Once the quadratic term is included 
to capture non-linearity, there is clear evidence in favour of a non-linear relationship 
that the smaller banks faced narrower CDS spread levels and credit risk as they were 
deemed to be safer relative to bigger banks.  For bigger banks with assets beyond a 
critical level, we find that the CDS spread is positively related to bank size. In order 
to reassert our previous findings, after having conducted the GMM analysis, we 
follow Leonida et al. (2012) and Lind and Mehlum (2010) to undertake the U-test 
which strongly supports the evidence that there is a U-shape relationship linking bank 
CDS spread and bank size. The outcome from U-test conducted following the GMM 
estimation allows us to conclude that bank size and the CDS spread are negatively 
related up until bank size reaches a certain threshold. After that threshold, the 
relationship between bank size and credit risk turns into becoming positive, meaning 
that the bigger the bank, the wider the CDS spread and vice versa. As such, when 
bank size goes up, the CDS spread level moves inversely with bank size. There is a 
critical threshold beyond which further rise in bank size leads to an increase in the 
CDS spread. 
Table 7 
Parameters estimation: Dynamic model 
Independent variable (1)   (2)   (3) 
Dependent variable: 
CDS spread 
(ln) 
        
  
Entire 
period 
  time < 2007   time ≥ 2007 
CDS spread (ln)t-1 0.182***   0.703***   0.199*** 
  (0.054)   (0.160)   (0.076) 
Liquidity -0.020***   -0.004***   -0.039*** 
(Liquid Assets / Dep & ST 
Funding) 
(0.006)   (0.001)   (0.010) 
Asset Quality 0.015***   0.006**   0.022*** 
(Impaired Loans / Equity) (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.005) 
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Leverage -0.014    0.350***   -0.024  
(Long-term debt to equity) (0.014)   (0.070)   (0.037) 
Operations Income Ratio -0.311***   -0.781***   -0.427*** 
(EBITA / Avg Assets) (0.059)   (0.119)   (0.100) 
Size -2.409*   -15.628**   -4.730** 
(ln Total Assets) (1.424)   (7.515)   (1.903) 
Size
2
  0.108**   0.546**   0.212*** 
(ln Total Assets)
2
 (0.054)   (0.273)   (0.075) 
Time dummies  (joint) 78.420   4.580    4.320  
Extreme Point 11.144   14.305   11.135 
Slope at:           
Minimum (p-value) 
-1.648 
(0.058)   
-11.785 
(0.022)   
-3.235 
(0.011) 
Maximum (p-value) 
1.514 
(0.003)   4.198 (0.049)   
2.979 
(0.001) 
Test for U-shape (p-value) 
1.580 
(0.058)   1.710 (0.049)   
2.350  
(0.011) 
Notes: The sample includes 115 banks in 20 countries from 2004 to 2011. All the 
models include time dummies. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
standard errors are clustered by country and reported in brackets. *** (**), [*] stands 
for the variable being statistical significant at 1% (5%) [10%] s.l. 
 
Following the estimated GMM results in Table 7, we can derive the bank size 
optimal point as follows: the optimal bank size in terms of absolute values will be 
exp(11.153) which approximately equals 70 billion Euros. Therefore, as long as bank 
total assets are below or equal to 70 billion Euros, bank size and the CDS spread will 
exhibit a negative relationship. Even with the dynamic GMM approach, there is still a 
critical level of bank size, although the threshold point is at a higher level compared 
to the optimal size derived in the fixed effects estimation. After this point, bank size 
and the CDS spread become positively related. Thus, bigger banks face more risk, 
while smaller banks are safer given that they experience narrower CDS spreads. 
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Considering the estimates in the two sub-periods, we however find a different 
extreme point of bank size (see Table 7) for the pre-crisis period which clearly 
reflects an increasing risk only for extremely big banks. The optimal bank size for the 
pre-crisis period in terms of absolute values was exp(14.305) which approximately 
equals 1642 billion Euros. The turning point has become significantly lower in the 
post-crisis period at around 70 billion.  It is probably for this reason Barth and 
Schnabel (2013) argued that bank size is not a satisfactory measure of systemic risk 
because it neglects aspects such as interconnectedness, correlation, and the economic 
context. To address extreme shocks of this magnitude or to disentangle the effect of 
systemic risk which rose sharply at the onset of the financial crisis in August 2007, 
we estimated the model in two sub-periods to determine the optimal bank size during 
the two regimes. In the pre-crisis regime when extremely big size banks experienced 
an increase in CDS spreads, implying too-big-to-fail or too-systemic-to-fail and too-
big-to-save using government bailout funds. We conclude that the identification of the 
optimal bank size can be contingent on the level of economic or financial condition 
(whether inflationary (pre-crisis) or deflationary (post-crisis) regimes).  
5. Conclusion 
This paper explores the key bank level drivers of bank CDS spreads during 
2004-2011, across 30 countries covering 115 banks. Most importantly, this research 
significantly contributes to the existing literature as it looks at the impact of bank size 
on the CDS spread and uncovers several important findings relating to optimal size of 
banks and credit risk. 
We find that the fluctuations of bank CDS spread strongly depend on: (i) the 
quality of the bank’s balance sheet; (ii) liquidity of banks’ assets; and (iii) how 
profitable banks’ operations are. As such, banks’ with better asset quality are subject 
to less credit risk. In addition, higher liquidity enables banks to avoid bank-runs and 
be more resilient to bankruptcy and insolvency. Finally, banks with higher levels of 
operating income ratio have more income to withstand a negative credit event such as 
the recent financial crisis, and therefore face lower CDS spread. We find that both 
regulatory capital and leverage appear to have a reduced ability to explain the 
variations in credit risk over the sample period. The results are consistent across 
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different methods of estimation including both static and dynamic models (FE, RE 
and the GMM estimations). 
When considering the impact of bank size on the CDS spread, we demonstrate 
that total assets and credit risk are negatively related up until a certain point, which 
we refer to in this paper as “bank optimal size”. Before this point, banks are 
considered to be either small or average, and are typically subject to reduced risk. 
After that point, bank size and the CDS spread become positively related, meaning 
that the bigger the bank, the higher the CDS spread. Our findings are in line with the 
previous literature on the too-big-to-save. In fact, while most banks during the credit 
expansion were trying to grow beyond their optimal size thinking that they will 
benefit from government support in case of a negative credit event, the recent 
financial crisis revealed that not all big banks are systematically saved. This leads us 
to the conclusion that smaller and medium sized banks are safer than large banks. 
Considering the estimates in the two sub-periods, we found a different extreme point 
of bank size in the pre-crisis period (approximately 1642 billion Euros) relative to a 
significantly lower level of optimal bank size (around 70 billion) in the post-crisis 
period, implying the case of too-big-to-fail and too-big-to-save in the pre-crisis 
regime, and a lower threshold level of bank size in the post-crisis period indicating 
reduced level of systemic risk in the banking sector globally. 
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Table A.1 
List of Banks 
ABN Amro Bank CREDIT LYONNAIS 
Lloyds Banking Group 
PLC 
ABU DHABI COMR BK 
CREDIT SUISSE 
GROUP 
MIZUHO CORP BANK 
LTD 
AKBANK TURK ANONIM 
Caixa Geral De 
Depositos MORGAN STANLEY 
ALFA-BANK (OJSC) 
Capital One Financial 
Corp Malayan Banking Berhad 
ALPHA BANK A.E. 
China Development 
Bank Mediobanca 
AOZORA BANK, LTD Commerzbank NAT BK OF ABU DHABI 
Alliance and Leicester 
Commercial Bank Credit Agricole NAT BK OF GREECE SA 
BAWAG P.S.K DANSKE BANK A/S NATIONAL AUS BK 
BAYERISCHE LANDESBK DBS BANK LTD NORD-LB – GIRO 
BCP FINANCE BK 
DEV BK OF JAPAN 
INC NORDEA BANK AB 
BNP Paribas 
DNB NOR BANK 
ASA 
Nationwide Building 
Society 
Banca Intesa DZ Bank Natixis 
Banca Italese Deutsche Bank Northern Rock PLC 
Banca Monte Dei Paschi Dexia 
OS CHINESE BKG CORP 
LTD 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro EFG Eurobank Ergas 
RAIF ZNTRLBK OSTER 
AG  
Banca Popolare Di Milano 
EMIRATES NBD 
(PJSC) RHB Bank Berhad 
Banco BPI 
ERSTE GROUP 
BANK AG Rabobank Nederland 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 
Argentaria SA 
Export-Import Bank of 
China Rosselkhosbank 
Banco Comr Portugues Fortis Bank SHINHAN BANK 
Banco Espirito Santo SA 
GAZPROMBANK 
(OJSC) 
SKANDINAVISKA 
ENSK BNKN 
Banco Pastor SA HANA BANK SNS Bank 
Banco Popolare Italiana HBOS Sberbank of Russia 
Banco Popular  HSBC Holdings PLC Societe Generale 
Banco Santander SA ICICI Bank limited State Bank of India 
Banco de Sabadell SA IDBI Bank LTD THE BTMBI UFJ LTD 
Bank of America Corporation 
IKB Deutsche 
Industrial Bank THE CO-OP BANK PLC 
Bank of China Limited IND & COM BK OF THE EXPT-IMPT BK OF 
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CHIN KOA 
Bank of India INDL BK OF KOREA 
THE GOLDMAN SACHS 
GP 
Bank of Moscow ING Bank  THE KOREA DEV BANK 
Bankinter 
Irish Life and 
Permanent Plc THE RBS GROUP PLC 
Barclays 
JP Morgan Chase & 
Co. TURKIYE IS BANKASI 
CAIXA D'ESTL DE CATA 
JSC BK 
CENTERCREDIT UBS AG 
CAIXA PNOS DE BARCA KBC Group Unicredito Italiano 
CATHAY UNITED BK CO 
LTD KOOKMIN BANK 
Unione Di Banche Italia 
(UBI Banka) 
CDA DE VLNCIA CASTLN 
KOREA EXCHANGE 
BANK VTB Bank 
CDA DEL 
MEDITERRANEO 
LANDESBANK 
BERLIN AG WESTLB AG 
CDA Y MP DE MADRID 
LB 
BADENWUERTTEM
BERG 
WESTPAC BANKING 
CORP 
CIMB BANK BERHAD 
LB HESSTHRGN 
GIRO WOORI BANK 
CITIGROUP INC.     
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Table A.2 
List of Countries 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Cayman Islands 
China 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hong Kong 
India 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Kazakhstan 
Malaysia 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Russia 
Singapore 
South Korea 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Taiwan 
Turkey 
UAE 
UK 
US  
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Appendix: The Principal Component Analysis 
To examine the potential impact of the existence of commom components in 
the set of regressors, we have conducted the Principal component analysis, whose 
results are summarized in this appendix. Being mainly interested in the likely non-
monotonic impact of bank size on CDS spread, we have examined the role of the 
principal common components in determining the CDS spread by keeping bank’s size 
outside the analysis. Results are reported in the Table A.3. 
Table A.3. 
The Principal Component Analysis 
Independent variable (1) (2) 
House Price Index (ln) 3.059* 2.065  
  (1.735) (1.643) 
Liquidity -0.010    
(Liquid Assets / Dep & ST Funding) (0.007)   
Asset Quality 0.027**   
(Impaired Loans / Equity) (0.010)   
Regulatory Capital -0.062    
(Tier 2 Capital) (0.118)   
Leverage 0.017    
(Long-term debt to equity) (0.032)   
Operations Income Ratio -0.401***   
(EBITA / Avg Assets) (0.109)   
1
st
 Common Component 
  0.066** 
 
  (0.025) 
2
nd
 Common Component 
  0.028** 
    (0.014) 
Size -7.036* 0.879  
(ln Total Assets) (3.590) (7.676) 
Size
2
  0.309** 0.036  
(ln Total Assets)
2
 (0.132) (0.276) 
Time dummies  (joint) 43.88 21.15 
Adjusted R
2
 0.796 0.744 
F-statistics for the joint exclusion of:     
All regressors but time dummies 15.41 14.61 
All regressors but time dummies and Size and 
Size
2
 10.54 6.44 
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All regressors but time dummies and Size 9.14 5.70 
Notes: The sample includes 115 banks in 20 countries from 2004 to 2011. All the models 
include time dummies. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are 
clustered by country and reported in brackets. *** (**), [*] stands for the variable being 
statistical significant at 1% (5%) [10%] s.l. 
 
Results suggests that there are two common components, and they can explain 
about 70% of the total variance. When added to the set of regressors in the place of 
the set of variables generating these, the model has a lower adjusted R
2
, with respect 
to the standard model. Moreover, the variable size and its squared values are not 
statistically significant. The two common components are statistically significant. 
However, the analysis of the F-statistic shows that this is because of multicollinearity 
between the common components and the size variable. In the light of these 
considerations, we have preferred the traditional model which we have reported in the 
main text. 
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Research Highlights 
 
1. In the wake of the recent global financial crisis, this paper re-examines the role of bank size on 
their credit default swap (CDS) spreads during pre- and post-crisis periods.  
2. CDS spread is driven by asset quality, liquidity and operations income ratio, with bank size 
showing a non-monotonic impact. 
3. An optimal level of bank size exits, and banks growing beyond this threshold are subject to 
higher credit risk, implying that smaller and medium sized banks are safer than large banks.   
4. In the pre-crisis regime, a different extreme point of bank size is found at 1642 billion Euros, 
relative to a significantly lower level of optimal size at 70 billion Euros in the post-crisis period. 
5. A higher optimal level does reveal evidence for too-big-to-fail and too-big-to-save in the pre-crisis 
regime, showing the case of systemic instability. 
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